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Integrating Europe’s Back Office 
10 years of turning in circles 
Karel Lannoo and Diego Valiante* 
 
The financial crisis has sharpened the debate on Europe’s back office architecture. This paper reviews the ECB’s 
decision to proceed with its Target 2 Securities (T2S) project, which aims to establish a common IT platform for 
securities settlement, reducing differences between current infrastructures. The apparently solid configuration of 
the project shakes, however, when we closely examine the impact of this common infrastructure on the competitive 
landscape. Notably, non-discriminatory access to the platform (low barriers to entry), clearer and independent 
governance, and full participation by Central Securities Depositories (CSDs and ICSDs) are essential conditions 
to ensure the initiative’s success. The paper also examines the possibility to build a level playing field for CSDs in 
Europe and evaluates the ESCB/CESR recommendations, discussing the progress achieved with the industry’s 
Code of Conduct and evaluating, as follow-up to the financial crisis, the relative merits of multiple vs single 
Central Counterparty Clearing (CCP) in OTC markets. 
he financial crisis sharpened the debate on Europe’s 
back office architecture. Ten years after the launch of 
the Giovannini group, which first sparked the debate 
about the inadequacy of the European framework, it seems 
that we are finally moving towards a more harmonised 
regime for clearing and settlement (C&S) providers in the 
EU. This inability to advance on what seems an arcane issue 
initially benefited the European Central Bank (ECB), which 
decided in July 2008 to go ahead with its Target 2 Securities 
(T2S) project. In the face of a disunited front of market 
participants, the ECB had a fairly easy task in creating a 
securities settlement monopoly – not exactly part of its 
mandate as described in the Maastricht Treaty. The direct 
access to T2S however re-ignited the debate on the 
minimum standards for European clearing and settlement 
(C&S) operators, discussions which had stalled since 2004.  
With the launch of T2S, other issues have come to the 
forefront. These concern the relationship between T2S and 
the non-eurozone EU member states and third countries, the 
European architecture for central counterparty (CCP) 
clearing, the treatment of derivative instruments and the 
impact of this infrastructure on the future competitive 
landscape in the post-trading sector. In addition, the crisis 
has highlighted the importance of safety, soundness and 
effectiveness of C&S but also the need for more 
transparency, and the benefits that would arise from a more 
robust post-trade infrastructure in OTC markets, in 
particular CCPs for credit derivatives to reduce counterparty 
risk and information asymmetries, e.g. credit default swaps. 
Although the subject is highly specialised and the know-
how limited to a few circles, clearing and settlement has 
been at the centre of an intense debate in recent years.
1 This 
could be explained as a spill-over of the Financial Services 
Action Plan (FSAP) and the problem of consolidating the 
back-office, whereby the current predominantly national and 
vertically consolidated securities transactions industry 
appears to inhibit European market integration. The MiFID 
directive (EC/2004/39) has led to a fierce price competition 
between trading venues, and allowed them to choose the 
venue for clearing and settlement, re-emphasising the need 
for adaptations further down the trading chain. T2S, the 
most important initiative on the settlement side, is taking 
place alongside other private initiatives that will reshape the 
C&S industry in Europe.  
                                                        
1 It suffices to look at the website of the European Commission on 
the subject to realise this. See for example the number of 
documents and positions posted under the heading ‘CESAME 
group’, dealing with the ‘Giovannini barriers’ to clearing and 
settlement (see http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-
markets/clearing/index_en.htm). 
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In this ECMI Policy Brief, we review the ECB’s decision to 
establish the T2S and discuss the outstanding issues. We 
will look into the question of the level-playing field for 
Central Securities Depositories (CSDs) in Europe and the 
ESCB/CESR recommendations. We review the progress 
achieved with the industry’s code of conduct and discuss the 
prospects for central counterparty clearing in OTC markets, 
as follow-up to the financial crisis. 
The ECB and T2S 
Following the green light of the EU Council of Finance 
Ministers, the ECB Governing Council decided on 17 July 
2008, to formally launch the TARGET2-Securities (T2S) 
project and to provide the resources required for its 
completion. It assigned the development and operations of 
T2S to Deutsche Bundesbank, Banco de España, Banque de 
France and Banca d’Italia, with a start of the operations 
foreseen for 2013. 
The ECB stated: 
T2S constitutes a major step forward in the delivery 
of a single integrated securities market for financial 
services, thus reinforcing the Lisbon strategy, and in 
particular the Code of Conduct on Clearing and 
Settlement and the harmonisation efforts through the 
Giovannini process. T2S will provide a single, 
borderless pool of pan-European securities, as well as 
a core, neutral, state-of-the-art settlement process. 
Market users will be able to access these assets 
through CSDs in a way which can accommodate, 
rather than perpetuate, national and regional 
differences, and which already embodies agreed 
harmonisation measures in several key areas”.
2 
In connection with T2S, a new collateral management 
system, CCBM-2, will be launched for the Eurosystem. 
CCBM-2 will allow the Eurosystem to manage collateral 
both for domestic and cross-border operations in a single 
pool for market participants. The decision was taken the 
same day as the decision to go ahead with T2S. The 
development and operations will be assigned to the central 
banks of Belgium and the Netherlands.  
The run-up to the formal launch of T2S had not been 
straightforward, however. The attitude of the EU Council of 
Finance Ministers was not unambiguous and even the final 
approval of the project was lukewarm. The Ecofin Council 
of 3 June 2008, simply stated “that the ECB has so far 
broadly met the conditions set by ECOFIN in February 
2007 for its continued political support”, and set some 
additional conditions, including “that the risks of cost and 
time slippage be robustly minimised for the sake of end-
users” and that “interested CSDs take a clear and 
unambiguous position on T2S in consultation with their 
participants and with issuers”.
3 
In February 2007, the Ecofin Council had already asked the 
ECB to proceed step by step, examining carefully the 
impact of the project on the securities settlement industry. It 
requested the ECB to clearly prove the business case for 
                                                        
2 ECB press release, 17 July 2008. 
3 Ecofin Council Conclusions, 3 June 2008, doc. 9720/08. 
T2S, and not to discriminate against non-participants. The 
Council expressed concerns about its possible monopolistic 
implications, when it stated that: “the design and operation 
of the project should comply with EU competition policy 
and aim at promoting competition and innovation in post-
trading services”, and raised questions about the governance 
of T2S.
4 
The financial crisis radically changed the scenario. In 
response, the Ecofin Council fully backed T2S in December 
2008: “in particular insofar as it contributes to the systemic 
safety of the post-trading environment”. Moreover, it 
stressed how important, safe and robust the post-trade 
infrastructure is and it affirmed that the EU should play a 
leading role in reshaping the post-trading foundations of the 
global financial system, even though T2S was not originally 
designed for that purpose.
5  
The basis for the ECB decision to implement T2S was a 
study conducted after the initial announcement of the 
project in July 2006 (ECB, 2008b). This study concluded 
that, if T2S had existed in 2007, settlement fees would be on 
average in a range between 39-57 cents per transaction in 
Scenario 1 (all transactions in euro) and between 26-44 
cents in Scenario 2 (including also non-euro currencies). 
This seems to be a good result compared with current 
average CSDs fees of 73 cents in Scenario 1 and 62 cents in 
Scenario 2. According to the ECB, the inferior costs in post-
trading services would translate into annual savings of: 
•  between €56 million p.a. and €118 million p.a. in 
Scenario 1, 
•  between €113 million p.a. and €228 million p.a. in 
Scenario 2, and 
•  between an additional cost (i.e. negative savings) of €14 
million p.a. and savings of €17 million in Scenario 3 (if 
only 50% of eurozone transactions participated).  
Table 1. The business case of T2S 
  Scenario 1 
All € 
transactions 
Scenario 2 
€ and non-
euro 
transactions 
Scenario 3 
50% of € 
transactions 
T2S fees  39-57 cent  26-44 cent   
Current 
fees 
73 cent  62 cent   
Savings 
(p.a.) 
€56-118 
million 
€113-228 
million 
€(14)-17 
million 
Source: ECB (2008b). 
The projections included development costs of €203 million 
for the complete project (2008-13). The study added, 
however, that even in scenario 3, T2S would generate 
sizeable economies if users’ savings in back office and 
collateral operations were considered. The latter together 
with the possible dynamic effects of market integration and 
increased efficiency brought the ECB to conclude that T2S 
                                                        
4 Ecofin Council Conclusions, 27 February 2007, doc. 6610/07. 
5 Ecofin Council Conclusions, 2 December 2008, doc. 6212/08. Integrating Europe’s Back Office | 3 
would result in a net macroeconomic result estimated 
between €1.1 and €1.6 billion per year. Using conservative 
estimates, the ECB thus concluded that the overall effect of 
the implementation of T2S would be very positive (ECB, 
2008b).  
A striking feature of the business case in favour of T2S is 
the importance of having non-euro markets on board, 
primarily the sterling market. The price per transaction goes 
down 30% if non-euro transactions are included. Further, if 
only 50% of euro transactions participate in T2S, there are 
no projected sizable savings in CSD fees, weakening the 
business case in favour of the scheme. Hence, the success of 
the initiative is related to the participation of all the CSDs in 
T2S, to thoroughly reap the benefits of the network’s 
positive externalities (costs reduction for the common 
platform). In today’s circumstances, an additional argument 
in favour of T2S is the additional tool it provides to monitor 
market stability, even though this is difficult to translate in a 
quantifiable economic gain.  
Considering the Ecofin’s request to maintain competition in 
the post-trading infrastructure, the viability of T2S thus 
raises serious questions. Moreover, it should be kept in 
mind that the ECB study was made on the basis of 2007 
data on settlement turnover. Nowadays, the costs will be 
higher because of significantly lower turnover.
6  
The benefits of T2S must be furthermore qualified. T2S will 
only form a small part of the overall market for post-trading 
services,
7 while the trade-off cannot be easily judged 
positive ex-ante (see Figure 1). In effect, the study does not 
calculate the negative costs of creating a monopoly, in terms 
of reduced efficiency and spur for innovation (dynamic 
efficiency). The issue of the low incentives to pass benefits 
on to final users through lower fees and to create synergies 
with other CSDs and custodians has not been addressed.
8 
Hence, our main concern is that, in a context of increasing 
competition in C&S, which is being further accelerated by a 
fierce competition between trading venues as a result of 
MiFID, settlement fees (anyway charged by T2S) might be 
fully internalised (through a cross-subsidisation 
mechanism). T2S may thus help to freeze the current market 
structure and reduce competition, slowing down the process 
that is positively shaping the competitive landscape and 
reducing the still high margins in the post-trading sector (see 
Figure 2).
9 As shown below, at the end of 2007, the 
                                                        
6 The turnover of cash equity traded on stock exchanges 
(Electronic Order Book) decreased from €14,821 billion in 
2007 to €12,723 billion in 2008 (source FESE). 
7 Deutsche Bourse quantified the post-trading services in the EU 
(clearing, settlement, custody, safekeeping and notary) at €17.4 
billion (which is 43% of the overall activities related to the trading 
of securities); Deutsche Bourse Group, “The European Post-Trade 
Market. An Introduction”, White Paper, February 2005, p.14 
(www.deutsche-boerse.com).    
8 Economies of scale are usually developed on a vertical level. 
9 EMCF slashed clearing fees of 40% for UK equities on 14 April 
2009 (http://www.euromcf.nl/editor/uploads/090407%20press% 
20release%20fee%20reduction.pdf) and EuroCCP reduced fees to 
5 euro cents per side on March 30 (http://www.euroccp.co.uk/ 
euroccp_fee_reduction.php).  
weighted average of the profitability ratio (EBTDA/Net 
Revenues) between the main players in clearing and 
settlement services was 51%.
10  
In addition, the ECB’s role is only limited to the 
consolidation of the cash settlement leg of those securities. 
It does not affect the securities settlement, where links 
between CSDs for non-euro transactions and other money 
tools are required (e.g., commercial bank money). In the US 
– often embraced as a model for the EU (lower fees)
11 – the 
cash settlement is made through agents, which are 
competing on liquidity and credit services.
12 The US 
experience in fact encompasses a more ‘market-oriented’ 
approach
13, which is, in this case, preferable to a ‘top-down 
approach’ (T2S). 
A centralised infrastructure may potentially increase the 
barriers to entry for new market players, which are 
requested to link with another CSD before getting into the 
market.
14 Thus, there is no evidence that a ‘top-down’ 
solution can improve competition in a market in which 
efficiencies usually come from vertical integrations and 
horizontal links between market players.
15  
The solution for the efficiency of the back office instead 
seems to be the “wrong tool”, but at the “right moment”. 
The regulator can better focus on the creation of an ad hoc 
regulatory framework and enforcement, following the 
pattern set by the code of conduct and exploiting the 
emerging private initiatives. The US experience was mainly 
focused on the establishment of a national market system for 
securities through the removal of barriers to competition, 
whereby the legislative action was a stimulus for an industry 
private solution. 
 
 
                                                        
10 In the US, DTCC (users-owned company) had a profitability 
ratio of 5% in 2007, while ICE US had a ratio of 42% in the same 
year. 
11 The US experience is expressly mentioned by the ECB as point 
of reference for T2S’s objective of cost reduction; see ECB 
(2007b). 
12 The Federal Reserve’s attempt to create an infrastructure similar 
to T2S (US Fedwire) for the settlement of government bonds was 
not successful (only 15% is settled through this infrastructure). 
13 The legislative action enacted in 1975 (Securities Acts 
Amendments) aimed to promote a unified national system through 
five objectives: efficiency, competition, price transparency, best 
execution and order interacting. The SEC was charged with 
achieving these objectives with the higher priority “to remove 
barriers to competition” (see Loomis, 1975, p. 8). 
14 The contestability of the market can only be assured through 
free entry and exit, not by the number of competitors (see Baumol 
et al., 1982). 
15 “By maintaining CSDs’ current role in relation to 
intermediaries, investors and issuers, the project ensures that there 
will continue to be choice and competition in the provision of 
services; if anything, T2S will provide greater possibilities for 
choice and competition.”; ECB (2007b), p. 3-4. 4 | Karel Lannoo & Diego Valiante 
Figure 1. Clearing & settlement and T2S 
            
Source: ECB (2007). 
 
Figure 2. Profitability ratios in C&S, by company 
 
Source: Companies’ 2007 income statements, including revenues from custody. 
Also other issues regarding the functioning of T2S remain 
to be clarified. An important point for existing CSDs in this 
regard is the governance of the system.
16 It impacts on many 
issues raised above, such as the reach of T2S, the pricing 
and the use of rebates for important clients, which remain to 
be clarified. In sum, T2S has yet to meet one of the 
conditions set by the Ecofin Council in February 2007: all 
CSDs should embrace T2S unambiguously.  
A final word on the legal background for T2S. Firstly, with 
T2S, the ECB will bear significant operational risk in the 
settlement of securities, which is not compatible with its 
primary objective, the maintenance of price stability.
17 It is 
difficult to consider T2S as a tool to improve monetary 
policy under Article 105(2) of the EU Treaty. Secondly, the 
ECB found legal support in the fact that T2S, as structured, 
is “an ancillary facility to the operation of Target2-Cash” 
(ECB, 2008a, p. 2), to give legal substance to the Art. 22 of 
the ESCB Statute. In effect, this article gives power to the 
ECB to provide facilities and regulation for “clearing and 
payment systems”, but there is no clear reference to 
                                                        
16 Further details on the governance arrangements for T2S were 
made public by the ECB in early April 2009, “Effective 
governance […] is necessary […] to ensure that […] benefits are 
passed on to the customers of the CSD” (ESCB-CESR, 2008, p. 
37). 
17 See ECB Statute (available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/ 
1341/1343/html/index.en.html) and ECB (2008a). 
securities settlement. The assertion of “ancillary facility” is 
legally misleading, although technically correct. In civil law 
countries, the transfer of the property is legally concluded 
when the object of the transaction is physically delivered to 
the other party. The ECB’s T2S plays – from a ‘property 
rights’ view – a more than ancillary role for the final 
delivery of the security and in respect to T2-Cash (e.g. 
failures in naked short selling).   
Lastly, no financial stability issues seem to be addressed by 
this solution. In effect, ECB will bear just the operational 
risk of the IT platform. The management of the collateral 
will be still fragmented between the participating CSDs, 
since the ECB cannot bear counterparty risk. The 
contribution to the financial stability by T2S is limited to the 
use of “real-time DvP settlement in central bank money and 
the use of state of the art technology with the highest 
contingency standards”,
18 which is still to prove since this is 
a solution never seen before and the risks of operational 
failures of the IT platform may give rise to negative 
financial consequences for all participants in the system 
(Kazarian, 2006). More in terms of better management of 
the collateral might be done with the introduction of 
Collateral Central Bank Management 2 (CCBM2), but this 
remains to be seen. 
                                                        
18 See ECB (2008a), p. 10.  Integrating Europe’s Back Office | 5 
T2S may provide the post-trading sector with a robust and 
efficient infrastructure for securities settlement. However, 
more should be done to seal the future infrastructure from 
risks and costs potentially burdening the whole post-trading 
sector. Non-discriminatory access to the platform (lowering 
barriers to entry), clearer and independent governance and 
full participation by CSDs to the initiative are the minimum 
conditions for success.  
What is left for CSDs and ICSDs? 
The prospect of T2S and the industry’s code of conduct 
gave a further boost to the restructuring and consolidation of 
the settlement industry. Two competitors are emerging: 
Link-Up Markets and the Euroclear group. Link-Up 
Markets is a partnership among 8 CSDs (initially 7) 
launched in May 2007 to build a common infrastructure in 
order to facilitate interoperability, which went live in April 
2009.
19 Euroclear launched ESES (Euroclear Settlement of 
Euronext-zone Securities) in January 2009 as a further step 
towards a single platform following on its earlier launch of a 
Single Settlement Engine. It has also included the Finnish 
and Swedish CSDs since October 2008 in the Euroclear 
group, and now brings together 7 CSDs.
20  
Link-Up Markets creates one common infrastructure with a 
centralised standard through which the participating CSDs 
interoperate. Clients are able to choose a single CSD as a 
service provider for all the participating markets, which 
should considerably reduce the costs of cross-border 
settlement. The cost savings should also result from 
leveraging the functionality and infrastructure of the 
existing CSDs, rather than creating a new settlement engine, 
as T2S does. In addition, Link-Up should allow its members 
to consolidate their custody activities. As T2S is likely to 
reduce income from settlement activities, CSDs need to 
expand their services in other directions such as custody and 
asset servicing. The value proposition of Euroclear group is 
similar but goes further, a common interface and single 
settlement and custody platform, providing savings to the 
industry, with the difference that the Euroclear platform 
builds upon an existing core of settlement, custody and asset 
servicing activities. 
One more important difference remains between Link-up 
markets and Euroclear’s Single Platform. Link-up markets 
will have to settle its transactions through T2S, whereas 
Euroclear insists on maintaining the choice between direct 
settlement (in central bank or commercial money) through 
its Single Platform and T2S. The point that T2S should not 
be anti-competitive was made all along the discussions on 
T2S in the EU Council of Finance ministers, but it strongly 
influences the economic case of T2S, as discussed above. 
                                                        
19 The CSDs Clearstream Banking AG Frankfurt (Germany), CSE 
(Cyprus), Hellenic Exchanges S.A. (Greece), IBERCLEAR 
(Spain), Oesterreichische Kontrollbank AG (Austria), SIS 
SegaInterSettle AG (Switzerland), VP Securities Services 
(Denmark) and VPS (Norway). 
20 Euroclear group comprises International Central Securities 
Depository (ICSD) Euroclear Bank in Brussels and Central 
Securities Depositories (CSDs) Euroclear Belgium, Euroclear 
Finland, Euroclear France, Euroclear Nederland, Euroclear 
Sweden and Euroclear UK & Ireland. 
Assuming that Euroclear has 50% market share in equity 
and debt securities settlement in the EU and stays outside 
T2S, it would imply that the fee structure of T2S could 
become considerably less attractive. Euroclear is not 
expected to choose between T2S and its own platform until 
2012, waiting to see how the market develops. As T2S will 
be a narrow settlement entity, additional services will be left 
to the local CSDs and ICSDs. And this is where the overall 
cost structure becomes important again, and the demand of 
clients. Much will thus depend on the exact cost figures of 
T2S, and the final answer of market players to the ECB 
initiative. 
The same choice does not apply to Link-Up Markets’ 
participants, which is why they want to extend and pool 
their services beyond pure settlement. However, their 
competitive strength will be affected as market participants 
could exploit differences among CSDs to their own benefit. 
This situation raises the question of the non-existence of 
harmonised rules for CSDs, and ultimately of the direct 
access to T2S. Although work on common standards was re-
started in the context of the ESCB-CESR group, this has 
just set a framework of non-legally binding rules 
(recommendations). In our view, the work on the 
recommendations, as well as the industry’s code, are a 
surrogate for an EU directive or regulation, as we will 
explain below.  
The ESCB-CESR Recommendations 
The search for common standards for CSDs started in 2001, 
in the maelstrom of the work undertaken by the Giovannini 
group, set up by the European Commission to assess 
barriers to cross-border clearing and settlement.
21 Given the 
absence of common EU-wide rules on clearing and 
settlement, CESR, the ECB and the national central banks 
agreed to work together to set common standards to enhance 
the safety, soundness and efficiency of the securities market 
infrastructure. The group took the CPSS-IOSCO Code as 
the basis, adapting them to the European situation. The 
CESR-ECB standards concerned the streamlining of 
procedures, the safety of the process, and the governance of 
and access to CSDs. In October 2008, they were watered 
down to recommendations and custodians were excluded 
from the scope. 
When work on the standards started in 2001, the authorities 
clearly indicated that they were not supposed to simply be 
recommendations, as in the case of the CPSS-IOSCO 
proposals, but more binding in nature. While the standards 
did not have Community law status, the relevant supervisors 
pledged to monitor their implementation. “Regulators, 
supervisors and overseers will thus integrate the standards 
into their respective assessment frameworks on a ‘best 
endeavour’ basis and in this way will assess compliance 
with them”.
22 On the other hand, the authorities stated that 
the standards would not prevent any future rules to be 
implemented regarding C&S activities. Should a directive 
                                                        
21 Giovannini Group (2001). The recent CESAME report (2008) 
provided an update on the progress achieved to eliminate these 
barriers. 
22 CESR-ECB (2004, p. 4) (available at www.ecb.int). 6 | Karel Lannoo & Diego Valiante 
on clearing and settlement be finally adopted, the 
recommendations would have to be assessed for conformity 
and, if necessary, amended accordingly. 
Work on the standards stalled soon after their publication in 
September 2004. Market participants were rather reluctant 
towards the initiative, considering that the rules were not 
binding and including custodian banks. One member state 
was radically opposed, and the European Commission was 
not so enthusiastic about the CESR-ECB initiative. The 
Commission had clearly indicated in April 2004 that it 
would adopt a high level directive, providing, inter alia, a 
common regulatory/supervisory framework for securities’ 
clearing and settlement in the EU. However, by the end of 
2004, the Commissioners changed, and with them the 
priorities. The new European Commissioner in charge 
became a firm proponent of self-regulatory initiatives. 
In 2008, the standards re-surfaced as recommendations with 
the European Commission request to CESR “to identify 
regulatory arrangements for post-trading infrastructures and 
to advise on possible solutions in terms of bridging any 
potential differences in post-trading arrangements in the 
Member States”.
23 As market participants had made a large 
number of link requests further to the adoption of the Code 
of Conduct’s Access and Interoperability Guideline in June 
2007, national regulators were concerned about the safety 
and soundness of financial infrastructure arrangements in 
other member states. The Commission request continues: 
“in the absence of common definitions and of authorisations 
and common operational requirements at European level for 
post-trading infrastructures such as CCPs and CSDs, the 
regulatory […] approaches […] differ”,
24 which sounds 
surprising, given the work of the CESR-ECB group, and the 
deliberate choice of the European Commission not to adopt 
a directive in 2006.  
ESCB-CESR restarted their work in June 2008, following 
the formal demand of the EU Council of Finance Ministers. 
In October 2008, it published a draft set of non-binding 
recommendations addressed to public authorities  only, 
rather than standards addressed to the providers of post-
trading services. The scope of the work is limited to 
securities settlement systems and CCPs based on the 
assumption that the capital requirements directive (CRD) 
applies to custodian banks. At the same time, CEBS was 
invited by the ECOFIN Council to examine whether the 
level playing field was respected as compared to custodians. 
The problem is that there is no single prudential regime for 
CSDs and CCPs in Europe, which may extend credit in 
some countries, and not in others, or only when it is fully 
collateralised. The report puts forward about 34 
recommendations for CSDs and CCPs, of which authorities 
should ensure a consistent implementation at both national 
and cross-border level. Barriers between member states 
should be removed to permit less burdened links between 
                                                        
23 Mandate to CESR for technical advice, identifying regulatory 
arrangements for post-trading infrastructures and advising on 
possible solutions in terms of bridging any potential differences in 
these arrangements, European Commission, 28 July 2008, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/ 
docs/clearing/2008_07_28_cesr_mandate.pdf. 
24 Ibid., p. 1. 
CDSs and more efficient coordination in the cross-border 
clearing activities of CCPs. 
The Code of Conduct 
After much hesitation, Commissioner McCreevy announced 
in July 2006 that there would be no EU directive, but that he 
would let the markets and the member states show that they 
can ease the environment for cross-border clearing and 
settlement. The Commissioner took comfort from the 
commitment of the industry to enact a Code of Conduct, 
which was formally announced in November 2006. Three 
years on, it seems that the policy discussion is back where it 
was some years ago. Work on the code seems to have 
opened some doors, but the basic problem, the unlevel 
playing field, remains and ultimately a directive will be 
needed.  
McCreevy based his decision in 2006 on 3 facts: 1) the 
environment of C&S is complex and rapidly changing, 
which makes any policy response difficult to tailor but also 
eventually constraining; 2) the implementation of MiFID 
brings more competition to exchanges and opens the 
possibility for direct membership of a clearing and 
settlement facility to investment firms (Art. 34); and 3) and 
the work on the Giovannini barriers is progressing, although 
more remains to be done (McCreevy, 2006a). An additional 
reason for not proposing a directive was the polarisation of 
interests of the different market participants. The 
Commissioner explicitly said that it would be very difficult 
to guarantee a good end-result, (“It could lead to an outcome 
far less optimal than letting things evolve...”), a rather 
dangerous statement vis-à-vis the EU Council and 
Parliament.
25 The EU Commissioner also referred to the 
T2S initiative, announced by coincidence a few days earlier, 
although it is well-known that he was unaware of the ECB’s 
plans. 
From an EU regulatory perspective, the code is a fairly 
revolutionary concept. It was announced on 7 November 
2006, by Commissioner McCreevy and the industry as a 
“voluntary self-commitment” towards “transparency, 
interoperability and competition in the sector”. The Code is 
essentially focused upon cash equity markets, although it 
could be extended, and covers trading venues, CCPs and 
CSDs. The infrastructures commit themselves to greater 
price transparency, access and interoperability, service 
unbundling and accounting separation. The Code was 
formally signed by the representatives of the European 
exchanges, the CCPs and CSDs, which created a joint 
project office for this purpose.
26  
The follow-up that has been given to the Code indicates 
how closely this is being monitored by the regulators, and 
could be considered as quasi-regulation. The European 
Commission created a Monitoring Group (MOG), which 
meets every quarter, and progressively discusses and details 
the different aspects of the code. It is attended by about 10 
o f f i c i a l s ,  m o s t  o f  w h o m  c o m e  f r o m  t h e  E u r o p e a n  
Commission, and includes representatives from CESR and 
                                                        
25 McCreevy (2006a). 
26 The code was signed by 60 institutions from 29 countries from 
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the ECB as well as about 45 industry representatives (users 
and infrastructures). It makes detailed summaries of the 
meetings, which set the progress on the different topics of 
the code.  
The progress on the code was initially impressive, but 
decelerated as more difficult issues such as access and 
interoperability came on the table. It could however also be 
related to the huge expectations that were created, and the 
limited patience of observers. Some of these matters 
effectively take time to materialise. 
-  Price transparency. Universal publication of fee 
schedules, discount and rebate schemes are part of the 
information already disclosed, thanks to the code, and 
implemented also by exchanges and CCPs. However, 
full comparability is extremely difficult to achieve, 
because of differences in business models, but progress 
has been achieved through the publication of conversion 
tables. The discussions led infrastructures to agree on a 
common glossary for settlement services. CSDs have 
agreed to disclose details about discount and rebate 
schemes on their websites, but some price simulators are 
still missing and the comparability is still difficult since 
the information is often complex. The competition policy 
directorate of the Commission added its voice on this 
subject, indicating it will monitor whether private 
discounts and abusive rebates are offered.
27 
-  Access and interoperability. Progress under these 
principles has recently been considerable, with the Link-
up Markets initiative on the settlement side and the 
arrival on the clearing side of EuroCCP and EMCF, 
which provide a multi-trading platform clearing facility 
and more competition between clearinghouses. In 
addition, LCH Clearnet started interoperability with SIS 
x-clear after the LSE’s decision to provide competing 
clearing services.
28 Recently, EuroCCP started 
interoperability with SIS x-clear for Turquoise’s 
platform. In addition, several other competitive clearing 
deals have been agreed, like LCH for European MTFs 
Bats Europe, Chi-X, Turquoise and Nyse Arca Europe
29 
as well as Nasdaq OMX competitive clearing solution to 
be launched later this year
30. However, vertically 
integrated exchanges remain dominant, which hampers 
the emergence of more horizontal model along the 
functions of the trading chain. On the operational side, 
the access to the provision of clearing services in 
competition is associated with the creation of three links 
(Commission 2008): i) a link with the trading venue for 
the transaction feed; ii) a link with the incumbent CCP in 
order to have interoperability; and iii) a link with the 
CSD in order to insure the access to the existing 
settlement platform. Transparency in negotiations, 
                                                        
27 See Joint Statement by DG Internal Market and DG 
Competition, 20 April 2007. 
28 See press release of 24 September 2008 
(http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/exeres/98718B10-
71DB-4C8A-91D6-94B9C76394D9.htm).  
29 See http://www.finextra.com/fullstory.asp?id=20006 
30 See 
http://ir.nasdaq.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=382961 
specific binding rules and enforcement are needed in 
order to avoid discrimination and unfair conditions for 
access among competitors.  
-  Service unbundling and accounting separation. This was 
initially the most difficult part of the code, as it touches 
the heart of the business model of vertically integrated 
exchanges, i.e. the provision of straight through 
processing, and thus the separation of trading, clearing 
and settlement within a single entity. CSDs have to 
unbundle also specific services, e.g. credit provision or 
securities lending. However, the recent progress under 
the other elements of the code, such as price 
transparency and the lack of standardisation for a 
complete interoperability has relegated this principle to a 
secondary role. At the October 2008 meeting, the MOG 
insisted that underpricing in a part of the trading chain 
would constitute cross-subsidisation. As part of the 
measures defined under the Code of Conduct, separate 
accounts will have to be submitted for the different 
layers of the value chain to external auditors and 
regulators (although these accounts remain confidential). 
This demand was underscored by the EU Council of 
Finance Ministers during its December 2008 meeting. 
But as the European Commission will supposedly not 
assess the detailed information, the question can be 
raised about how meaningful this will become, and to 
what extent the lessons will be drawn.  
The drawbacks of the Code of Conduct are the lack of a set 
of binding rules and risks of weak enforcement and 
implementation at national level. On the other hand, the 
code provides the basis for work on more binding rules, in 
an EU directive or regulation. Experiences in other sectors 
with high fixed costs (as telecommunications, transport, 
etc.) suggest that direct intervention through regulation 
could be a more preferable way to address market players’ 
incentives to enact the code’s principles (instead of ‘pure’ 
self-regulation). In effect, price transparency, access and 
interoperability, service unbundling and accounting 
separation need a background of binding regulation on 
which the private players can eventually self-regulate with 
the strong supervision and the flexible enforcement of the 
authorities at a national level. The supervisory and 
enforcement function could be done efficiently by national 
securities regulators, with supranational control exercised by 
the CESR.   
The impact of the financial crisis: Multiple or 
centralised solution(s)? 
The crisis not only strengthened the political support for 
more binding post-trade solutions, it also underscored the 
benefit of more centralised approaches to maintain financial 
stability. Whereas MiFID had abolished trading monopolies 
and liberalised markets, the crisis re-emphasised the 
usefulness of mandating central solutions. Policy-makers, 
with Commissioner McCreevy in the first place, suddenly 
changed their tone and called for industry initiatives to bring 
more centralised clearing in over-the-counter (OTC) 
markets.  
The first segment in sight was the credit derivatives market, 
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accounted for 4% of the OTC derivatives market, according 
to the BIS ($38 trillion out of $680 trillion by end-2008).
31 
By 19 February 2009, a commitment was made by the nine 
largest dealer firms in the US to use a central counterparty 
for CDS, the product which brought Bear Sterns and AIG 
down. By March 4, IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) began 
processing and clearing credit default swaps through ICE 
Trust, its central counterparty clearing (CCP) house for 
CDS. It is likely that this initiative will spread to other 
segments of the securities transaction chain, increasing 
transparency in non-equity markets.  
The competition among CCPs to be the first mover in CDS 
clearing, both in Europe and in the US, is intense. CCPs 
need to have the adequate infrastructure, know-how and 
personnel to manage the business. They need to have the 
operational and risk management capacity to run a CCP, and 
attract the capital for the guarantee fund. ICE Trust was the 
first who managed to launch operations in the US with an 
ad hoc infrastructure for CDSs. In assessing the 
authorisation, the Federal Reserve took financial and 
managerial aspects closely into account.
32 Moreover, the 
recent ISDA publication (April 2009) of new standards for 
CDS contracts will help the clearing and settlement of these 
derivatives with contractually disclosed information and the 
creation of a committee for asset evaluation. This protocol 
will further standardise CDS contracts, helping to reduce the 
outstanding notional amounts in the future. 
CCPs interpose themselves between counterparties in 
financial contracts, becoming the buyer to the seller of the 
contract and the seller to the contract’s buyer. In the absence 
of a CCP, each market participant bears the risk, known as 
counterparty credit risk, that one or more of its 
counterparties will default. By interposing itself between 
participants and thereby assuming counterparty credit risk, a 
CCP enables market participants to accept the best bids and 
offers that reduce the risk that a counterparty may default. 
By assuming counterparty credit risk and enforcing 
participation standards and margin requirements, CCPs also 
can help to diminish systemic risk in market settlement 
activities. They can also reduce systemic risk by mutualising 
the losses of closing positions of a defaulting participant.
33  
In the EU, candidates for CDS clearing are Eurex, LCH 
Clearnet and Liffe (NYSE-Euronext), which through Bclear, 
launched their CCP on CDSs already from last December, 
and others are preparing to be operational. ICE also plans to 
create a CCP for CDSs in Europe through its subsidiary, 
ICE Clear Europe (ICE Trust Europe). The Japan Securities 
Clearing Corporation (JSCC) and the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSX) have expressly showed interest to enter in 
the market for clearing of CDSs and interest rate swaps in 
EU and US, through links with LCH Clearnet for the EU. 
From a bank’s management perspective, given the global 
and concentrated nature of the CDS business, a single CCP 
would be more beneficial than multiple ones. However, the 
management of counterparty risk through a centralised 
                                                        
31 See ISDA’s website at http://www.isda.org/credit/.  
32 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/ 
20090304a.htm.  
33 Drawn from Federal Reserve (2009). 
solution for clearing should be balanced with stricter margin 
requirements also for non-clearing financial institutions 
(regulated and not-regulated), which trade these products.
34 
In effect, centralised solutions allow better management of 
collateral and greater transparency, but the huge exposure to 
a single CCP could increase systemic risk. Therefore, 
stricter requirements for participants should be balanced 
with the greater possibility of moral hazard that would 
burden markets with unsustainable risks, especially in case 
of a single CCP.  
The clearing of CDSs in multiple CCPs, instead, increases 
the cost for the banks and reduces the efficiency and the 
transparency of the transaction. There are also concerns 
from a supervisory perspective in a fragmented scenario. 
Policy considerations may be different, and a CCP 
authorised in the US falls outside any EU control (relying 
on US supervision and enforcement). The European 
Parliament called, in its amendments to the capital 
requirements Directive, for an EU supervised clearing house 
for CDS.
35 This situation, however, highlights the absence 
of harmonised standards for clearing and settlement entities 
in the EU. A regulatory level playing field does not exist if 
different entities want to propose CCPs for credit 
derivatives in the EU.
36  
Moreover, questions can be raised about the desirability of a 
decentralised and fragmented supervisory framework for 
clearing of other products in the OTC market. It seems 
preferable that for clearing of OTC products (not including 
CDSs), conclusions can be drawn in favour of multiple 
CCPs. These products have on average less concentrated 
risk than CDSs, even though they are extremely fragmented. 
A competitive clearinghouse environment with lower fees, 
more capital and increasing dynamic efficiencies appears to 
be more suitable than expensive centralised solutions. The 
growth of electronic execution platforms and specific 
technology will improve real time transactions and price 
discovery. A decentralised solution, in effect, may help to 
monitor the fragmented reality of OTC products to better 
face the ever-changing risk and structure behind these 
sophisticated products. However, the financial turmoil will 
press for centralisation also for other OTC products, as well 
as for higher capital and tighter margin requirements for 
clearing and non-clearing institutions (mainly unregulated 
institutions) operating with these products. This debate will 
come even more to the forefront as this crisis unfolds, and 
the tendency towards more mandated centralised solutions 
will progress. 
 
                                                        
34 See Recommendation 2 and 4, ESCB-CESR (2009), pp. 13-18. 
35 After a commitment from the industry to create a CCP, the EP 
called for an EU Commission study on the functioning of CDS 
markets by the end of 2009, see A6-0139/2009 EP first reading – 
Amendment of Directive 2006/48/EC Art. 156, paragraph 3a 
(added); see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/ 
file.jsp?id=5696832.   
36 Although the ESCB-CESR standards were revised to take into 
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Conclusions 
The architecture for the post-trading infrastructure has been 
an issue of intense debate over the last ten years. The 
financial crisis highlighted again the lack of an EU-wide 
regulatory and supervisory solution for C&S, the same 
question on which the Giovannini group started in 1999. 
Many issues at stake in clearing and settlement 
(Giovannini’s barriers) are still related to differences in 
regulation, taxation and enforcement, which cannot be 
solved by infrastructures with unclear benefits. In effect, the 
regulatory vacuum benefited the European Central Bank to 
embark into this field and launch T2S. T2S is a narrow 
settlement entity, which will force CSDs to focus their 
competitive efforts further downstream the trading chain. 
However, the big question for the viability of T2S remains 
the participation of Euroclear and the Sterling market. The 
ECB can benefit from the reputation earned during the 
financial crisis to convince these parties to participate when 
the project starts in 2013.  
T2S emphasises again the lack of a common regulatory 
model for C&S in the EU. T2S should be open for all CSDs 
 
 
in the EU, but lacking a common regulatory framework, an 
uneven playing field continues to exist. The work on the 
code, although useful, cannot be entirely satisfactory, as the 
enforcement of price transparency, access and 
interoperability remains tricky. The code is therefore just an 
initial step; it draws a pattern on which the European 
legislator can base a specific regulatory framework. Those 
objectives, therefore, need specific regulation and strong 
enforcement that can eventually be performed by national 
securities authorities in cooperation with an upgraded 
CESR.  
Also the crisis highlighted the importance of safety, 
soundness, and effectiveness of C&S in the EU, and the lack 
of a common regulatory framework. Policy-makers now 
want centralised clearing for certain credit derivative 
contracts, but a more harmonised regulatory and integrated 
supervisory framework is missing. Hence, they want more 
control without setting the scene for a harmonised European 
clearing and settlement industry. 
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